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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

E. Transfer and Protection of Industrial
and Intellectual Property
PATENT INFRINGEMENT PRACTICE BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION*
Infringement of United States patents by imported goods
is one of the "unfair methods . . . and acts . . ." proscribed
by 19 U.S.C. § 1337, et seq.1 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
* The author acknowledges the research assistance of W. Paul Zampol.
1. UNFAIR PRACTICES IN IMPORT TRADE Unfair
(a) UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION DECLARED UNLAWFUL. methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect
or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such
an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States,
are declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with,
in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section.
(b) INVESTIGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS BY COMMISSION; TIME LIMITS. - (1)
The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint
under oath or upon its initiative. Upon commencing any such investigation, the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal Register. The Commission shall
conclude any such investigation, and make its determination under this section, at
the earliest practicable time, but not later than one year (18 months in more complicated cases) after the date of publication of notice of such investigation. The Commission shall publish in the Federal Register its reasons for designating any investigation as a more complicated investigation. For purposes of the one-year and 18
month periods prescribed by this subsection, there shall be excluded any period of time
during which such investigation is suspended because of proceedings in a court or
agency of the United States involving similar questions concerning the subject matter
of such investigation.
(2) During the course of each investigation under this section, the Commission shall consult with and seek advice and information from, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and such other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate.
(3) Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this section, the Commission has reason to believe, based on information before it, that the matter may
come within the purview of section 303 or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall
promptly notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that such action may be taken as
is otherwise authorized by such section and such Act.
(c) DETERMINATIONS, REVIEW. - The Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation conducted by it under this section, whether or not there
is a violation of this section. Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) shall
be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with
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1930, as amended by section 341 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides remedies to certain persons injured by this illegal conthe provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code. All legal
and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases. Any person adversely affected
by a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d) or (e) may appeal
such determination to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Such
court shall have jurisdiction to review such determination in the same manner and
subject to the same limitations and conditions as in the case of appeals from decisions
of the United States Customs Court.
(d) EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY. - If the Commission determines
as a result of an investigation under this section, that there is violation of this section,
it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after
considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the
Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and
upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse
such entry.
(e) EXCLUSIONS OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY DURING INVESTIGATION EXCEPT
UNDER BOND. If, during the course of investigation under this section, the Commission determines that there is reason to believe that there is a violation of this
section, it may direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person with respect
to whom there is reason to believe that such person is violating this section, be
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such
exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded
from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action
under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry. The Commission shall
notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such
exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the
proper officers, refuse such entry, except that such articles shall be entitled to entry
under bond determined by the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary.
(f) CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS. - In lieu of taking action under subsection
(d) or (e), the Commission may issue and cause to be served on any person violating
this section, or believed to be violating this section, as the case may be, an order
directing such person to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair methods or acts
involved, unless after considering the effect of such order upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such order should not be issued. The Commission may at any time, upon
such notice and in such manner as it deems proper, modify or revoke any such order,
and, in the case of a revocation, may take action under subsection (d) or (e), as the
case may be.
(g) RFuERRAL TO THE PRESIDENT. - (1) If the Commission determines that
there is a violation of this section, or that, for purposes of subsection (e), there is

192

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

duct.2 The exclusive forum for section 337 causes of action is
reason to believe that there is such a violation, it shall(A) publish such determination in the Federal Register, and
(B) transmit to the President a copy of such determination and the action
taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f), with respect thereto, together with the record
upon which such determination is based.
(2) If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the
day on which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy reasons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval,
then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken
under subsection (d), (e), or (f) with respect thereto shall have no force or effect.
(3) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), such determination shall,
except for purposes of subsection (c), be effective upon publication thereof in the
Federal Register, and the action taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f) with respect
thereto shall be effective as provided in such subsections, except that articles directed
to be excluded from entry under subsection (d) or subject to a cease and desist order
under subsection (f) shall be entitled to entry under bond determined by the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary until such determination becomes final.
(4) If the President does not disapprove such determination within such
60-day period, or if he notifies the Commission before the close of such period that he
approves such determination, then, for purposes of paragraph (3) and subsection (c)
such determination shall become final on the day after the close of such period or the
day on which the President notifies the Commission of his approval, as the case may be.
(h) PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENEss. - Except as provided in subsection (f) and
(g), any exclusion from entry or order under this section shall continue in effect until
the Commission finds, and in the case of exclusion from entry notifies the Secretary of
the Treasury, that the condition which led to such exclusion from entry or order
no longer exist.
(i) IMPORTATIONS By OR FOR THE UNITED STATES. - Any exclusion from
entry or order under subsection (d), (e), or (f), in cases based on claims of United
States letters patent, shall not apply to any articles imported by and for the use of the
United States, or imported for, and to be used for, the United States with the authorization or consent of the Government. Whenever any article would have been excluded
or would not have been entered pursuant to the provisions of such subsections but for
the operation of this subsection, a patent owner adversely affected shall be entitled to
reasonable and entire compensation in an action before the Court of Claims pursuant
to the procedures of section 1498 of title 28, United States Code.
(j) Dm'INITION oF UNITED STATES. - For purposes of this section and sections 338 and 340, the term 'United States' means the customs territory of the United
States as defined in general headnote 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975) as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, tit. III, § 341, 88 Stat. 2053 (hereinafter cited as section 337). For legislative history and purpose of the Act, see [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186.
See also infra note 2.
2. The Trade Act of 1974 was signed into law by President Ford on January 3,
1975. Section 341 of the Act became effective on April 3, 1975 and all ongoing in-
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the United States International Trade Commission.3
This article examines the role of the Commission and its
powers, practices and procedures relating to infringement of domestic patents by imported goods. The scope of the article is
limited to cases brought under the amended section 337. Prior
case law, still relevant in many areas, is not discussed. The
purpose of this article is to offer one who may be unfamiliar with
this forum an idea of its operations and advantages and disadvantages as an alternative forum to federal courts. The first
section of the article analyzes the changes made to section 337
by the Trade Act of 1974. Second, the elements of section 337
investigation are discussed and the manner in which the elements
of a section 337 cause of action have been dealt with in recent
Commission determinations is analyzed in detail. Next, the recently promulgated Rules of Practice and Procedure are examined
vestigations under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975) were deemed to have been
commenced on that date.
Patents are mentioned by name in only two provisions:
SAME;

IMPORTATION

OF PRODUCTS

UNDER

PROCESS

COVERED BY

CLAIMS

OF

- The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product
made, produced, processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by
the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same
status for the purposes of Section 1337 of this title as the importation of any
produce or article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States
letters patent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) (Supp. V 1975) exempts enforcement of commission determinations and orders against articles imported by or for the United States Government
and grants to the Court of Claims jurisdiction over actions brought by patent owners
who are adversely affected by the exemption. See infra note 13.
Patent infringement, however, was held to be an "unfair act" in several investigations under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the predecessor to the present
section 337. See, e.g., Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259-60 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930); In re Onion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 465, 468, 21 U.S.P.Q.
563, 568, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1934); In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 444, 108 U.S.P.Q. 371,
374 (C.C.P.A. 1955). For a thorough discussion of all of the patent determinations
decided under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and its predecessor, section 316 of
the Tariff Act of 1922, see Kaye & Plaia, Rezitalization of Unfair Trade Causes in
the Importation of Goods: An Analysis of the Anmendments to Section 337, 57 J.P.O.S.
268, 269 (1975). See also Musney, Tariff Act's Section 337: Vehicle for the Protection and Extension of Monopolies, 5 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 56 (1973). Patent
infringement has been found in determinations brought under new section 337 to
constitute an unfair act. See note 37, infra, and accompanying text.
UNEXPIRED PATENT.

3. Pursuant to section 171 of the Trade Act, the United States Tariff Commission changed its name to the United States International Trade Commission. 40 Fed.
Reg. 2627 (1975).
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and, finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the forum are
discussed.
I.

CHANGES MADE TO SECTION 337 BY THE TRADE
ACT OF 1974

The 1974 Trade Act amendments to section 337 made substantial changes in the role of the Commission with respect to
unfair trade practices in import trade. These changes are more
clearly understood in light of the history of section 337.
The United States Tariff Commission, the forerunner to the
Commission, was granted general jurisdiction over unfair trade
practices in import trade under section 316 of the Tariff Act of
1922.' This jurisdiction was not significantly changed by section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.1

4. Section 316 of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 provided:
(a) That unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States, or to prevent the establishment of such industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are hereby declared unlawful,
and when found by the President to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any
other provisions of law, as hereinafter provided....
(d) That the final findings of the commission shall be transmitted with the
accord to the President.
(e) That whenever the existence of any such unfair method or act shall be
[he may levy additional duties
established to the satisfaction of the President ...
within limits] . . . or in what he shall be satisfied and find are extreme cases ...
he shall direct that such articles as he shall deem the interests of the United States
shall require, imported by any person violating the provisions of this act, shall be
excluded... and upon information of such action by the President, the Secretary
of the Treasury shall through the proper offices . . . refuse such entry, and that
decision of the President shall be conclusive....
(g) . . . [Any refusal of entry under this section shall continue in effect
until the President shall find and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury that the
conditions which led to the assessment of such ... refusal of entry no longer exist.
19 U.S.C. § 174 (1926).
5. UNFAIR PRACTICES IN IMPORT TRADE.
Unfair
(a) UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION DECLARED UNLAWFUL methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either,
the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry,
efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the estab-
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The 1930 Act authorized the Commission to investigate unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
or sale of foreign goods in the United States. In order to find a
lishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in
the United States, are hereby declared unlawful, and when found by the President
to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as hereinafter provided.
(b) INVESTIGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS BY CoMMIsSIoN. - To assist the President in making any decisions under this section the commission is hereby authorized to investigate any alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or
upon its initiative.
(c) HEARINGS AND REVIEW. - The commission shall make such investigation
and give such notice and afford such hearing, and when deemed proper by the
commission such rehearing, with opportunity to offer evidence, oral or written,
as it may deem sufficient for a full presentation of the facts involved in such
investigation. The testimony in every such investigation shall be reduced to
writing, and a transcript thereof with the findings and recommendation of the
commission shall be the official record of the proceedings and findings in the case,
and in any case where the findings in such investigation show a violation of this
section, a copy of the findings shall be promptly mailed or delivered to the importer or consignee of such articles. Such findings, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive, except that a rehearing may be granted by the commission
and except that, within such time after said findings are made and in such manner
as appeals may be taken from decisions of the United States Customs Court, an
appeal may be taken from said findings upon a question or questions of law only
to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by the importer or
consignee of such articles. If it shall be shown to the satisfaction of said court
that further evidence should be taken, and that there were reasonable grounds for
the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceedings before the commission, said
court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the commission in
such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may deem
proper. The commission may modify its findings as to the facts or make new
findings by reason of additional evidence, which if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive as to the facts except that within such time and in such manner an
appeal may be taken as aforesaid upon a question or questions of law only. The
judgment of said court shall be final.

(d)

TRANSMISSION OF FINDINGS TO PRESIDENT. -

The final findings of the

commission shall be transmitted with the record to the President.
(e) EXCLUSION O ARTICLES FROM ENTRY. - Whenever the existence of any

such unfair method or act shall be established to the satisfaction of the President
he shall direct that the articles concerned in such unfair methods or acts, imported by any person violating the provisions of this Act, shall be excluded from
entry into the United States, and upon information of such action by the Presi-

dent, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, through the proper officers, refuse such
entry. The decision of the President shall be conclusive.
(f) ENTRY UNDER BOND. - Whenever the President has reason to believe
that any article is offered or sought to be offered for entry into the United States
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violation, an investigation by the Tariff Commission required an
affirmative finding on each prong of a two-pronged test: first,
whether unfair methods or acts were present and, second, whether
the methods or acts injured a United States industry.8 The findings of the Commission were reported to the President of the
United States, who alone made the final decision as to whether
a violation had been found. When a violation was found, the only
remedy was an exclusion order, effected by the Secretary of the
Treasury at the direction of the President. Thus, the Tariff
Commission was an investigative agency with no enforcement
power.
The Trade Act of 1974 made several major changes to section 337.7
One change is that the determination of violation is now the
exclusive domain of the Commission, subject to limited Presidential review.8 Thus, the President cannot take any action purin violation of this section but has not information sufficient to satisfy him thereof, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, upon his request in writing, forbid entry
thereof until such investigation as the President may deem necessary shall be
completed; except that such articles shall be entitled to entry under bond prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(g) CONTINUANCE OF EXCLUSION. - Any refusal of entry under this section
shall continue in effect until the President shall find and instruct the Secretary
of the Treasury that the condition which led to such refusal of entry no longer exist.
(h) DEFINITION. - When used in this section and in sections 1338 and 1340
of this title, the term "United States" includes the several States and Territories,
the District of Columbia, and all possessions of the United States except the Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, and the island of Guam.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
6. The concept of "injury", as used in this article, encompasses the several alternative statutory tests in Section 337(a). See infra note 63 et seq. and accompanying text.
7. There are several sources which analyze these changes. One important reference is Remarks of Will E. Leonard, Jr., Chairman, United States International
Trade Commission, to the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Washington, D.C., May 10, 1976, 72 F.R.D.
239, 252 (1977). For a very concise presentation, see Importation of Articles Involving U.S. Patents: Impact of Tariff Act, Section 337, as Amended, 271 PAT. T.M.
& COPYRIGHT J. C-1 (March 25, 1976). See also Kaye & Plaia, supra note 2, and
Kaye, Unfair Competition Appeals under the Trade Act, 57 J.P.O.S. 659, 665 (1975).
8. Section 337(c), (g). The Senate Report states:
The major committee amendments would change the existing provisions of
section 337 as they relate to the basic respective roles and authority of the President and of the Commission. Under the amendments, the Tariff Commission
would be granted final authority to determine, subject to judicial review, whether
section 337 has been violated, and would in such case order the exclusion from
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suant to section 337 without a finding of violation by the Commission. The President retains a veto power which may be
exercised when he finds that, notwithstanding the Commission's
determination of violation and order of remedy, other international policy interests of the United States are paramount.
Another change is that all legal and equitable defenses may
be asserted so that the Commission may review the validity and
enforceability of patents for purposes of section 337 determinationsY Previously, the Commission seldom entertained these
defenses because it did not believe it could do so.10 The manda-

tory language of section 337 resolves this confusion; legal and
equitable defenses have been entertained in all determinations
decided under the amended section 337.11
entry of articles involved in such violation or issue a cease and desist order
(a new remedy provided by the Committee's amendments).
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS -7326 (hereinafter cited as Senate Report).
9. Section 337(c). The Senate Report states:
[T]he public policy recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in the field of
patent law [cf., Lear, Inc. v. Atkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)] and the ultimate issue
of the fairness of competition raised by section 337, necessitate that the Commission review the validity and enforceability of patents, for purposes of section
337, in accordance with contemporary legal standards when such issues are raised
and are adequately supported.
Senate Report at 7329.
But the Senate Report goes on to state that a Commission determination on
the validity of a patent and the review of that determination by a federal court, is to
have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in cases involving the patent
before federal courts:
The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as
binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular factual contexts.
Therefore it seems clear that any disposition of a Commission action by the
federal court should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in cases
before such courts.
Id. at 7329.
This statement is probably incorrect. Although no appeal of a Commission
determination has been decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals since
the 1974 Trade Act amendments, it seems clear that any review pursuant to the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Article III court will be given res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect by other such Article III courts. Therefore, determinations by Commission, as Article I court, may have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect;
review of such determinations by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, an
Article III court, will probably be given such effect.
10. This uncertainty by the Commission is articulated in the Senate Report:
The Commission has also established the precedent of considering U.S. patents as
being valid unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction has held otherwise.
Id. at 7329. See also Kaye and Plaia, supra note 2, at 277-78.
11. See infra note 41 et seq. and accompanying text.
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A further change is the expansion of available remedies.12
Previously, the only remedy was to exclude 13 the imported articles
from entry into the United States. This remedy is retained under
the present scheme. In addition, a cease and desist order is now
available. 4 This order may be modified or revoked at any time,
and if revoked, may be replaced by an exclusion order. 15 The
cease and desist order is generally 16in personam, in contrast to
the exclusion order which is in rem.
Another change is that a determination is required within
one year of the institution of the investigation. 7 Thus, these
12. Section 337(d), (e), (f).
13. Section 337(e), (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 5. When the United
States government is the importer or the imported goods are for it, an exclusion order
is not available. Section 337(i). See supra note 2. In such a case, however, the
patent owner must seek damages from the United States Customs Court. The Senate
Report states:
Section 337(i) of the Act, as added by your Committee, would provide that any
exclusion order or cease and desist order issued by the Commission in connection
with a violation, or reason to believe there is a violation, of this section based
upon the claims of United States letters patent, would not apply to articles
imported by or for the use of the United States, or imported for, and to be used
for, the United States with the authorization or consent of the government. Any
patent owner adversely affected by this section would be entitled to reasonable
and entire compensation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. It is the intention of
your Committee that whenever the government participated in the particular
Commission proceedings under section 337, or had notice thereof and an opportunity to participate, the only question before the Court of Claims under this
section would be the amount of the reasonable and entire compensation.
Senate Report at 7332.
14. Section 337(f). The remedy of a cease and desist order was added, as stated
in the Senate Report, because the exclusion remedy "is so extreme or inappropriate
in some cases that it is often likely to result in the Commission not finding a violathus reducing the effectiveness of [the] section . . . . The power to issue
tion ....
cease and desist orders would add needed flexibility." Senate Report at 7331.
15. Section 337(f). See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
16. An exclusion order applies to all products involved in the investigation and
may apply to all imported products that infringe the subject patent. Thus, an exclusion order is in rem. In contrast, a cease and desist order is generally in personam
since it applies only to the named person and not to imported products. A cease and
desist order may take on an in rem aspect when it orders the named parties not to
infringe the subject patent. For discussion of enforcement, see supra notes 98, 99.
17. Id. In a "more complicated" investigation, a determination is required within
18 months of the institution of the investigation. Section 337(b). See infra note 150
and accompanying text. The Senate Report states:
The Committee bill would require that . . . investigations . . . be completed
within a one-year period. The Commission would be given an additional 6 months
in complicated cases, provided that it publish the reasons for the extention. Any
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stringent time limits put pressure on the Commission to complete investigations with reasonable speed.
A further change is that all investigations must be conducted
in accordance with the due process requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as the A.P.A.) . s
Thus, an adequate record must be made to support the determination, the right to cross-examination must be provided when
required, and the hearing must be conducted before an impartial
fact finder. All of these requirements are being met in investigations and are reflected in the Rules. 19
Another change is the separation of the Commission's investigative staff from the Commission in order that there be no
substantive contact with respect to an ongoing investigation. °
The Commission's investigative attorney is responsible for protecting the "public interest" by assuring that all relevant evidence
21
is presented.
A further change is the requirement that, if the Commission
finds a violation, it must weigh the action to be taken against

period during which the Commission's investigation is suspended because of
proceedings in a federal court or agency involving the same subject matter
would be excluded from the time periods.
Senate Report at 7212.
18. Section 337(c). Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551-59 (1970).
The Senate Report notes the competing interests of the time limits and the Administrative Procedure Act and states:
Both determinations of whether section 337 is being violated and whether there
is reason to believe that there is a violation of this section [337(c)] would be
required to be made by the Commission on the record after notice and opportunity for a full hearing in conformity with the provisions of subchapter II of
Chapter 5 of Title 5 of the United States Code [the A.P.A.]. The full hearing required would be a full "due process" hearing, with the Commission of course being
able to impose reasonable restraints on the time to be devoted to such hearings.
Senate Report at 7328.
19. See discussion infra note 116 et seq. and accompanying text.
20. Pursuant to section 3 3 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) requires:
. . . An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or
agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel
in public proceedings.
21. This is inferred from the legislative purpose in the Senate Report: "The
Committee feels that the public interest must be paramount in the administration of
this statute." Senate Report at 7326.
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the effect on the public interest.22 Certain federal agencies which
have expertise in relevant areas of the public interest must be consulted by the Commission. 23 If the public interest factors are found
to be overriding, relief may not be granted even though a violation
has been found by the Commission. 4 If the public interest factors
are not deemed to be overriding, and the Commission decides to
order the appropriate remedy, a bond must be set. The bond is
required in a "reason to believe" determination which results in
a Temporary Exclusion Order. This bond remains in force until
the completion of the investigation, at which time, if a violation
is found and a remedy ordered, the bond may be modified or
terminated pending presidential action. The bond is automaticupon presidential action on the expiration of the
ally terminated
25
60-day period.

22. Section 337(d), (e), (f).
23. Section 337(b) (2). The Senate Report states:
Section 337(b) (2) of the Act, as amended, would also provide that during the
course of a Commission investigation, the Commission must consult with, and seek
advice and information from, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission, and also any
other governmental source it deems appropriate. The Commission under the
Committee's amendments, is required, as noted above, to consider before ordering
any exclusion of entry or issuing any cease and desist order, the impact of such
action on various interests, including consumers, competitive conditions in the
economy, and the public welfare. Various government agencies, such as those
named above, will often have significant information, as well as sound advice,
about such impact.
Senate Report at 7327-28.
24. Supra note 23.
25. Section 337(e). The Senate Report states:
Under this amended section 337(e), as under present law, the articles forbidden
entry would in fact be entitled to entry under bond. However, while under
present law the bond is determined and prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, under amended section 337(c), the Commission would determine the amount
of the bond and inform the Secretary of the Treasury of the amount of the
bond to be prescribed. It is intended that the determination of the Commission
regarding the amount of the bond be binding upon the Secretary, whose function
is to prescribe the bond. In determining the amount of the bond the Commission
shall determine, to the extent possible, the amount which would offset any competitive advantage resulting from the unfair method of competition or unfair act enjoyed by persons benefiting from the importation of the article. After making a
determination under this section, the amended section also would require that the
Commission consider the impact of its action under this section on the interests
referred to in section 337(d), as amended, i.e., the public health and welfare,
consumers, etc.
Senate Report at 7330-31.

TopicAL SURVEY

201

A final change is that the mandatory time limits may be
tolled while there is an ongoing suit in federal court involving
the subject matter of a Commission investigation. 26 In this situation, the Commission's investigation may be suspended, either
by the Commission or the court.27
II. THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 337
DETERMINATION
There are four elements which must be satisfied in order to
permit a determination of violation and order of remedy.
The first element is the occurrence of an unfair method or
act.2

The complainant must be the owner, assignee or licensee

of a valid United States patent under which legal protection is
claimed, and must establish that the challenged import infringes
that patent. The respondent can attack the allegation in two
ways. All legal and equitable defenses are available to establish
that the patent is invalid.2 9 Respondent may also show that the
challenged import does not infringe any of the claims of the
patent in issue. Therefore, in order to find an "unfair method or
act," the Commission must conclude that the patent is valid
and enforceable, the complainant is entitled to enforce the patent,
and the challenged import infringes the patent.
26. Section 337(b) (1). The Senate Report states:
Any period during which the Commission's investigation is suspended because of
proceedings, in a federal court or agency involving the same subject matter, would
be excluded from the time periods. . . . Under the Committee bill, decisions by
the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reviewing Commission decisions
under section 337 should not serve as res judicata or collateral estoppel in matters
where U.S. District Courts have original jurisdiction.
Senate Report at 7212.
27. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 182 U.S.P.Q. 595 (D.
Minn.), rev'd, 183 U.S.P.Q. 400 (8th Cir. 1974). For a good discussion of the Pfizer
case, see Kaye & Plaia, supra note 2, at 230-36.
In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
185 U.S.P.Q. 449 (D. Minn. 1975), Judge Lord enjoined plaintiff-patentee for 60 days
from prosecuting an investigation under section 337. The court based the injunction
on the primary jurisdiction of federal courts to apply and interpret patent and antitrust laws: it is the court's decision whether duplicate litigation before the U.S.I.T.C.
impairs the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the court found its jurisdiction impaired by the section 337 investigation and that the duplicate proceedings put an unwarranted burden on the alleged infringers.
28. Section 337(a). See discussion infra note 37 et seq. and accompanying text.
29. Section 337(c). See discussion infra note 41 et seq. and accompanying text.
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The second element is injury.3° To establish that an injury has occurred, it must be shown that the unfair method or
act had the "effect or tendency of destroying or substantially
injuring an efficiently and economically operated United States
industry, or preventing the establishment of such an industry, or
restraining or monopolizing trade or commerce in the United
States."'1 It should be noted that without a finding of injury,
a violation cannot be found, even though an unfair method or
act has been found.
If the Commission finds both that an unfair method or act
occurred and that an injury has been established, it must decide on
the appropriate remedy. The Commission must weigh the effect
of this remedy on the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like
or directly competitive articles in the United States and United
States consumers. 2 The Commission is required by section 337
to consult with certain named federal departments and agencies
3
and may seek advice from others.1
Finally, the Commission's determination of violation and its
remedy order is subject to presidential review. The Commission's order is effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
The President may disapprove the Commission's order for public
policy reasons.3 4 If he does so within the 60-day time limit for
30. Section 337(a). See discussion infra note 76 et seq. and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. Section 337(d), (e), (f). See discussion infra note 99 et seq. and accompanying text.
33. Section 337(b) (2).
34. Section 337(g). The Senate Report states:
Following the issuance of exclusion or cease and desist orders by the Commission,
the President would have 60 days in which to intervene and override the Commission's decision where he determined it necessary because of overriding policy
reasons.
Senate Report at 7212. The Senate Report further states:
The President may, within 60 days after receipt of such determination, disapprove for policy reasons the Commission determination. The President would
then notify the Commission of his disapproval, and on the date of such notice, the
determination and the action taken with respect to it would have no force or

effect. It is recognized by the Committee that the granting of relief against imports could have a very direct and substantial impact on United States foreign
relations, economic and political; further, the President would often be able to
see the impact which the relief ordered by the Commission may have upon the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy,
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review, the remedy ordered no longer has force or effect, even
though the violation has been determined. If the Commission's
determination is affirmed or the President takes no action within
the statutory time limit, the Commission's order automatically
goes into effect and any interim bond is terminated.3 5
III.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 337 ELEMENTS BY

THE COMMISSION
This section presents and analyzes the individual statutory

elements of section 337 as dealt with in recent Commission determinations.3 6
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
United States consumers.
Therefore, it was deemed appropriate by the Committee to permit the President to intervene before such determination and relief become final, when he
determined that policy reasons require it. The President's power to intervene
would not be for the purpose of reversing a Commission finding of a violation
of section 337; such finding is determined solely by the Commission, subject
to judicial review.
Id. at 7331-32. See discussion infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
35. The procedure by which a Commission's order is put into force is unclear.
In a case of exclusion orders, subsections (d), (e) state that "[tlhe Commission shall
notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action . . . directing such exclusion from
entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers,
refuse such entry."
It should be noted that the form of notice to the Secretary of the Treasury
is not specified. Federal Register notice may not be required.
In contrast in a case of a cease and desist order, subsection (f) states that
the Commission may issue and cause to be served on any person violating this
section an order directing such person to cease and desist in engaging in the unfair
methods or acts involved .. "
The Commission has yet to publish guidelines pertaining to the enforcement of
exclusion and cease and desist orders.
36. Four cases have been decided under section 337 to date. Each is now discussed.
Certain Ultra-Microtome Freezing Attachments (hereinafter cited as UltraMicrotome), Investigation No. 337-TA-10, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 771, April 1976, 41
Fed. Reg. 14948 (1976). This investigation was instituted on August 14, 1974, and
the Commission issued its determination on April 2, 1976. Complainant was a United
States corporation and exclusive licensee under a United States patent on a freezing
attachment for an ultramicrotome laboratory apparatus. The patent was owned by a
foreign subsidiary of complainant. Complainant sought to protect its subsidiary's
patent and sought to protect itself on the grounds that it was about to begin domestic
manufacture under the patent. Respondents were a domestic importer and a foreign
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A. UNFAIR METHOD OR ACT
It is almost beyond doubt that patent infringement constitutes an "unfair method or act" within the purview of section 337.
No party to any determination under section 337 has argued that
corporation alleged to be importing and offering for sale a product which infringed
complainant's subsidiary's patent.
The Commission determined that there was no violation because there was
no "injury" to embryo, infant or existing domestic industry. The Commission held
that, since complainant did not domestically manufacture the patented product, section
337 did not apply and, since complainant had not shown a "management decision" to
begin domestic manufacture, no prevention of establishment of an industry had
occurred. It must be noted that the Commission bypassed the unfair method or act
element and, in effect, viewed the injury element as a standing requirement under
section 337.
Expanded, Unsintered Polytetrafluorethylene in Tape Form (hereinafter
cited as Tape Form), Investigation No. 337-TA-4, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 769, April
1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 14947 (1976). This investigation was instituted on September 13,
1972 and the Commission issued its determination on April 3, 1976. Complainant
was the owner of a United States patent on a product it manufactured to seal pipe
threads. Respondent imported an alleged infringing product into the United States.
All six Commissioners found that no violation had occurred and ruled for
respondent, but they split evenly on the legal basis for their determination.
The first group of three found that respondent's imported product did infringe complainant's patent. However, they found that complainant's patent was
invalid, and thus unenforceable, based on respondent's successful assertion of the
patent defenses of anticipation and "on sale." Since the first group found that the
patent was invalid, they did not reach the injury element.
The second group also found that respondent's imported product did infringe
complainant's patent. They found that complainant's patent was valid because respondent had unsuccessfully asserted the patent defenses of obviousness, "on sale,"
anticipation and fraud. However, they found that complainant had not proved sufficient injury. Thus, by two different analyses, the Commissioners found that complainant had not established a violation under section 337, and held for respondent.
Chain Door Locks (hereinafter cited as Chain Door Locks), Investigation
No. 337-TA-5, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 770, April 1976, 191 U.S.P.Q. 272, 41 Fed. Reg.
14948 (1976). This investigation was instituted on June 21, 1973, and the Commission
issued its determination on April 3, 1976. The complainant was owner and licensor
of three United States patents pertaining to chain door locks. Only one of several
named respondents took an active part in the investigation.
Respondent stipulated that its imported product did infringe one of complainant's patents but contended that the infringed patent was invalid for obviousness.
The Commission's investigative attorney asserted that the patent was invalid because
of obviousness and that the unobvious claims had been waived under a "file wrapper"
estoppel theory.
Five Commissioners found the patent valid and rejected all of the asserted
patent defenses. This group found that the injury element had been established and
that no "public policy" considerations had been presented to override their finding of
violation. Four of the five Commissioners decided that an exclusion order was the
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the infringement of a valid United States patent is not an unfair
trade practice within the meaning of the statute.8 7
appropriate remedy; the fifth Commissioner recommended a cease and desist order.
The majority set bond at a value substantially lower than the full-value bond which
had been the ordinary practice prior to the passage of section 337. The President took
no action within the statutory time period on the Commission's determination of violation and the accompanying exclusion order; the order remains in effect at this time.
The fourth determination, Reclosable Plastic Bags (hereinafter cited as
Plastic Bags), Investigation No. 337-TA-22, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 801, January 1977,
42 Fed. Reg. 4222 (1977), was decided after this issue went to press. It is discussed
in detail here and infra notes 42, 78, 112 and 115.
This investigation was instituted on January 12, 1976, and the Commission
issued its determination on January 17, 1977. Complainant was a United States corporation and exclusive licensee under a valid United States patent on the manufacture
of reclosable plastic bags. The patent was owned by a foreign concern. Two other
domestic reclosable plastic bag manufacturers under franchise agreements with complainant subsequently joined as co-complainants. A domestic manufacturer of reclosable plastic bags for sale to the retail market under a sublicense did not join as a
co-complainant. Respondents were foreign manufacturers, foreign exporters and
domestic distributors of imported reclosable plastic bags.
Five of the Commissioners found the patent valid and rejected all of the
asserted patent and antitrust defenses. These five Commissioners also found that the
injury element had been established and that no public policy considerations had been
presented to override their finding of violation. They decided that an exclusion order
was the appropriate remedy. These Commissioners set the bond at full value after
rejecting the recommendation of Chairman Minchew that the bond should be set at
300 percent of full value. President Carter took no action and the statutory time
period expired.
Commissioner Ablondi dissented. He found that no injury had occurred,
noting that there had been a substantial increase in domestic sales of both infringing
and non-infringing reclosable plastic bags between 1970 and 1975. He also noted the
increases during the five-year period of domestic production and the number of United
States workers employed in the manufacture of reclosable plastic bags. He noted
that, of the two complainants who had submitted profit-and-loss data, both had experienced a similar pattern of sizable growth and prosperity. He found that the infringing products never constituted more than 1.5 percent of the total U.S. production
of the patented product and found that such a small quantity of imports could not have

the "effect of substantially injuring or tendency to substantially injure the domestic
industry."
37. See, e.g., Chain Door Locks, supra note 36:
No party here has asked us to re-examine the holding that infringing a valid
United States patent is an unfair trade practice within the meaning of section 337,
and we will not do so. We will continue to follow the holding....
Id. at 18, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 279.
The Senate Report noted:
For a period of approximately 50 years, the Commission has entertained complaints of importation or sale of articles allegedly made in accordance with the
specifications and claims of a U.S. patent, first under the provisions of section
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The Patent Act of 1952 attaches a rebuttable presumption
of validity to an issued United States patent.3 8 In Chain Door
Locks four Commissioners subscribed to this presumption of
validity.39 However, in Tape Form this presumption was not
expressly mentioned. 0
Since there is a presumption of validity of an issued United
States patent, the first step in a Commission determination is
to determine whether the patent has been infringed by the imported goods.
The presumption of patent validity may be rebutted by
any of the legal or equitable defenses; these defenses may now
be raised in a determination under section 337.41 The patent
316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, and then pursuant to successor provisions in section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In its investigations under these provisions, the
Commission had found that, under certain circumstances, the importation or
domestic sale of an article manufactured abroad in accordance with the invention
disclosed in a U.S. patent constitutes one type of unfair method or unfair act
within the meaning of the statute.
Senate Report at 7329. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38. "A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of the
patent shall rest on a party asserting it." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
This presumption of validity has been the source of both extensive comment
and repeated litigation, but there is still much disagreement as to its true force
and effect.
The generally accepted theory is that the presumption of validity serves to
place the burden of proof on the party asserting invalidity; the presumption has no
independent evidentiary value because of the inherent limitation of the ex parte
Patent Office proceeding. Rains v. Niagva, Inc., 406 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1969). Some
courts have stated that the most evidentiary weight that the presumption of validity
can be given is that it requires reasonable doubt to be resolved in favor of the patent
holder. Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1962), 134 U.S.P.Q.
152, aff'g 195 F. Supp. 719, 131 U.S.P.Q. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). This appears to be
the theory accepted by the Commission in Chain Door Locks, supra note 36.
39. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 20, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 280.
40. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 14-15 and Plastic Bags, supra note 36, at 8.

41. Section 337(c). The Senate included a defense based upon claims of price
gouging in its version of section 337. The Senate Report defined the defense:
[P]rice gouging in this section is intended to convey the idea of unconscionable
pricing policies by the holder of a patent or a party operating under such patent.
For example, price gouging could be found to exist if the prices a party producing
under the patent is receiving for the article covered by the patent have no reasonable relationship to his costs, including an appropriate share of general research
and development expenses, or when such prices are unreasonably higher than the
prices generally received under comparable circumstances for similar articles,
especially when the article is important to the health and welfare. The Commission would also consider the evolution of patent law doctrines, including defenses
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defenses which have been raised in recent determinations are:
obviousness based on prior art references, obviousness based on
estoppel, "on sale," anticipation by prior patent or printed publication, anticipation by public use and fraud.42 While these
based upon antitrust and equitable principles, and the public policy of promoting
"free competition" in the determination of violations of the statute.
Senate Report at 7329.
The gouging defense, however, was removed prior to passage of the Trade
Act of 1974. Conference Report on the Trade Act of 1974, H. CONF. REP. No. 931644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7391.
42. In Plastic Bags, supra note 36, several defenses were asserted before the
Commission for the first time.
The defense of patent exhaustion was unsuccessfully asserted, at 9-10. The
five Commissioners cited Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) for the proposition
that the first sale of a patented product "exhausts the patent control by the patentee";
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.; 157 U.S.'659 (1895) for the proposition that the
patent confers no right upon the patentee to attempt to control the destiny of a
product after it has been sold; and Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) for the rule
that the rights of a licensee under a foreign patent have no bearing on the rights
accorded under United States patent laws.
The Commissioners found the exhaustion defense inapplicable because there
was no evidence on the record of any respondent having a license to sell bags after 1973.
The defense of laches and unclean hands was also unsuccessfully asserted,
at 8-9. The five Commissioners rejecting the laches defense stated that it has two
required elements. First, the patentee must have waited an excessive long period of
time before enforcing a right of action against the infringer. Second, the infringer
must be led to change its position by the inaction of the patentee. The Commissioners
stated that this second element was lacking because they found an oral agreement to
cease importing the infringing bags existed between the respondent asserting laches
and one complainant.
It is important to note that these five Commissioners stated that the Commission is not bound by the laches defense under section 337. They noted that there
is no requirement under section 337 that the unfair act be discovered by a certain
date. Moreover, even if the unfair act is discovered at a late date or reported at a
late date by the complainant, the Commission is still free to rectify the situation.
Thus, it may be impossible to successfully assert the laches defense. See infra note
152 and accompanying text.
Four antitrust defenses were also unsuccessfully asserted, at 10-12. The first
defense was division of markets. The Commissioners cited General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) for the proposition that a patent
owner may limit an assignment or license on lines drawn according to field of use.
They found that the complainant/exclusive licensee had not employed an unreasonable
field of use restriction by granting franchise agreements or sublicenses to the other
complainants with such restrictions. The second antitrust defense was accumulation
of patents. The Commissioners cited Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) for the proposition that mere accumulation of
patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal. The Commissioners
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defenses have not often been successfully asserted, suggesting
strong adherence to the presumption of validity by the Commission, it is probably too soon to make an accurate assessment.
B.

DEFENSES

OBVIOUSNESS BASED ON PRIOR ART REFERENCES
Two determinations 3 have dealt with the obviousness defenses 4 and both adopted the Supreme Court test set forth in
Graham v. John Deere & Co.'5 The John Deere test specifies
three factors which constitute the specialized reasonable man
standard for obviousness. Certain secondary factors may be confound that the acquisitions of 50 patents in the plastic bag and associated fields were
proper transactions and not acts in furtherance of an anticompetitive scheme. They
also noted that the subject patent was the only one of the 50 that was relevant in the
investigation. Another defense was based on a grant-back provision. The Commissioners cited Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
648 (1947) for the proposition that a grantback, i.e., a covenant in a patent license
that requires the licensee to license or assign improvement patents to the licensor,
is not illegal per se and unenforceable. They stated that the Supreme Court rule
has been applied where there was no evidence that the exclusive license grant-back
provision constitutes an undue restraint or exerts an adverse effect on trade or commerce. The Commissioners found that grant-back of a nonexclusive license to use
the improvement was reasonable and legal. They seem to be implying that nonexclusive licenses have less of an effect on trade than exclusive licenses or assignments
since nonexclusive licenses have less of a propensity to discourage the licensee's incentive to invent. A further defense was a charge of a network of exclusive dealerships.
The Commissioners cited United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967) and United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill.
1968) for their finding that the dealerships in Plastic Bags were reasonable.
43. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36; Tape Form, supra note 36.
44. A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
45. Graham v. John Deere & Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966):
[T]he scope and content of the prior act are to be determined; differences
between the prior act and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined.
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sidered.4 6 The required factors of the John Deere test are: scope
and content of prior art, difference between prior art and the
claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the art. This analysis was
used by the Commission in Chain Door Locks. 7
The scope and content of prior art is the first element that
must be established in order that the issue of obviousness may be
decided against specific references. The parties may stipulate as
to pertinent prior art subject to the final determination of the
Commission.4

Respondent should submit the file wrapper of the;

patent in issue into evidence, and, as in Chain Door Locks,49 may
submit all pertinent uncited references to the Commission.
The differences between the pertinent prior art and the
claims must also be established. In Chain Door Locks and Tape
Form the Commission acknowledged the use of expert testimony
as an acceptable method to establish this factor.5 0 In Chain
Doors Locks only the complainant's expert testified and the Commission found that the difference between the pertinent prior art
and the claims had been established without any expert testimony from respondent.5 ' The Commission noted, however, that
the patent in issue did not involve complex art which might require respondent to provide expert testimony. In Tape Form
the absence of expert testimony from either party resulted in a
finding of non-obviousness because in complex art, such as this
case, the differences between pertinent prior art and the claims
52
could not be established.

The third factor of the John Deere test is a determination
of the level or ordinary skill in the art; in Chain Door Locks,
46. "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light of the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at 17-18.
47. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 22-30, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 281--84.
48. 41 Fed. Reg. 17717 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §§ 210.40,
210.42). These are the first amendments to the Rules. See infra notes 116 et seq. and
accompanying text.
49. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, was decided prior to the effective date of
the amended Rules of Practice and Procedure, discussed infra. Nevertheless, the
parties in Chain Door Locks stipulated to the pertinent prior art in exhibits and
testimony at a prehearing conference. Id. at 23, 26, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 281, 282.
50. Id. at 23-24, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 281; Tape Form, supra note 36, at 14-15.
51. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 23-24, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 281-82.
52. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 14-15.
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the Commission implied that there are two approaches. 53 The
first approach, which applies no matter how complex the pertinent
art may be, is to establish the standard by expert testimony and
other appropriate proof. The second approach, which may apply
only in cases involving less complex pertinent art, is that the
definition of the specialized reasonable man follows a fortiori
from the definition of the scope of the pertinent prior art. 4 Thus,
under the second approach, expert testimony might not be
55
required.
Once the three factors of the John Deere test have been
established, the Commission must decide whether the patent
claim is obvious.5 6 In Chain Door Locks, the Commission
analyzed the problems discovered by the patentee and the solutions claimed in the patent, and determined that the "invention
as a whole," viewed in light of the presumption of validity, produced a nonobvious "synergistic result": the "whole in some way
57
exceeds the sum of its parts.
OBVIOUSNESS

BASED ON FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL

In Chain Door Locks,58 the Commission considered the defense of obviousness based on file wrapper estoppel 9 but the
53. Chain Door Locks, supranote 36, at 27-29, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 282-83.
54. Id. In support of inferring the level or ordinary skill without expert testimony, the Commissioners cited Preuss v. General Electric Co., 392 F.2d 29, 157
U.S.P.Q. 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
55. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 27-29, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 283. It must be
noted that the Commission heard testimony of complainant's expert witness, who was
the holder of a patent subsequent in time and in the pertinent art of the subject patent.
Absent this testimony, it seems that the majority would have been hard pressed, even

.in this simple art, to find that the third element of the John Deere test had been
satisfied by respondent.
56. Id. at 29-30, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 283--84.
57. Id. The majority cited Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage
Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) as precedent for the "synergistic result" standard
and A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151 (1950) for
the "whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts" standard, and Application of
Aufhaser, 399 F.2d 275, 158 U.S.P.Q. 351 (C.C.P.A. 1968). The Commission also
considered evidence of secondary factors submitted by respondent and the Commission's
investigative attorney, but found it unpersuasive.
58. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 30-31, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 283-84.
59. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel prevents the patentee from expanding

the scope of the claims beyond that scope adopted in securing allowance of the application. It is the general rule, however, that amendment of claims in response to a
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extent to which it may be utilized is not yet clear. The Commission found against respondent since the material not considered
by the Patent Office was not obvious and, therefore, the alleged
infringed claims were not adversely affected by the file wrapper
rejection. The Commission also stated that, in an appropriate
case, the defense of obviousness based on file wrapper estoppel
might be used to narrow the claims of a patent in a section 337
determination. 0
ON SALE
In Tape Form6' three Commissioners found the subject
patent invalid because a competing product within the scope of
the patent claims had been "on sale" 62 in the United States for
more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent. The
Commissioners performed a three-step analysis. First, it was
factually established that the competing product was within the
scope of the patent claims one year prior to the filing date. The
respondent met the burden of proof by introducing two items of
evidence. A deposition of the owner of the foreign manufacturer
of the competing product taken in a related action revealed that
the process used by the manufacturer included all of the critical
elements of the invention disclosed by the patent. Corroborating
measurements by American purchasers of the competing product
established that the parameters of the competing produce were
within the scope of the patent claims.
non-prior art rejection does not involve any element of file wrapper estoppel. P.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 300-01 (1975).
The theory argued in the Chain Door Locks was that the material not covered
by "file wrapper rejection" was obvious and, therefore, the claims were obvious. But
the majority found that "the material not covered by the file wrapper rejection is
not obvious" and, thus, file wrapper estoppel could not be used to narrow the claims.
Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 31, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 284.
60. Id. at 30-31, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 283-84. As an example of the application of this
defense, the majority cited Koppers Co., Inc. v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co.,

Inc., 517 F.2d 1182, 1185, 185 U.S.P.Q. 705 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 9-11.
62. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless - (b) the invention was . . .
on sale in this country more than one year prior to the date of application for patent
in the United States .. " 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
Tape Form, supra note 36, at 9-12.

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

Second, the three Commissioners found that the manufacturer's deposition established that an unrestricted sale had occurred more than one year prior to the date of the application.
Finally, the Commissioners concluded that the "on sale" defense had been established because complainant failed to show
that the unrestricted sale came within the experimental use
exception, 63 which might have otherwise permitted the sale.
The other three Commissioners disagreed and found that
sale" defense had not been established. 4 The basis for
"on
the
their finding was that the evidence which proved that the competing produce came within the claims of the patent was circumstantial and not beyond a reasonable doubt. Although these
Commissioners cited no authorities for this standard, it may be
based on the presumption of validity of an issued patent.
ANTICIPATION BY PRIOR PATENT OR PRINTED PUBLICATION
In Tape Form65 the defense of anticipation by prior art 6
was raised. Complainant disclosed a previously uncited and undiscovered Russian Certificate of Invention having an effective
date prior to the filing date of the patent in issue. The administrative law judge found that the Russian patent anticipated the
United States patent in issue. Complainant proved that the inventor had met the standard for invention prior to the effective
date of the Russian reference by virtue of the "whole" of the body
of inventor notes and accompanying affidavits. Complainant
maintained that the notes established that the inventor had
reduced the invention to practice prior to the effective date of
63. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 11. In support of this analysis, the three Commissioners cited Kalvar Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 384 F. Supp. 1126, 1129, 182 U.S.P.Q.
532 (N.D. Cal. 1973). In Kalvar, the court stated that the burden of proof on the
issue of "on sale" rests heavily upon the party seeking to establish the defense but
that, once sufficient evidence is presented, the burden of proof shifts to the patent
holder to establish by convincing proof that the sale came within the experimental
use exception. This exception permits testing and perfection of the invention without
commencing the one year limitation specified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), supra note 62.
64. Tape Form, supranote 36, at 15.
65. Id. at 2-9, 15-16.
66. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless - (a) the invention was . . .
patented or described in . . . this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent. . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1970).
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the Russian reference, and that "optimum parameters of commercial production" were being established on or after that date.
The judge agreed with complainant that the inventor had conceived of his invention and had pursued his concept diligently
toward a reduction to practice prior to the effective date of the
Russian patent and held the United States patent valid."'
The entire Commission held that a complainant may antedate a reference by a showing of conception and diligence prior to
the effective date of that reference. They specifically rejected
the standard of conception and reduction to practice recommended by the judge.6
One group of three Commissioners affirmed the judge's findings and conclusions that the evidence adequately proved that
conception and due diligence had occurred prior to the effective
date of the reference.6 9 These Commissioners found that the
inventor's notes were sufficient evidence to corroborate the main
evidence of conception, which consisted of the testimony of witnesses in affidavits and depositions in parallel litigation.
The other three Commissioners overruled the judge and found
the patent invalid because it had been anticipated by the Russian
reference and because complainant had failed to prove that the
date of conception was prior to the effective date of that reference."' These Commissioners accepted the unswom and unauthenticated inventor notes as corroborating documentary evidence but concluded that the notes failed to meet the requisite
high standard of proof and that the affidavits and oral testimony
did not mitigate this insufficient showing.
Although both groups applied the same standard for countering the defense of anticipation by prior art, each group required
67. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 5.
68. Id. at 5, 15. In support of this standard, the group of Commissioners who
found the subject patent had been anticipated by the Russian reference cited Reed v.
Tornquist, 436 F.2d 501, 168 U.S.P.Q. 463 (C.C.P.A. 1971) and Gould v. Schawlow,
363 F.2d 908, 150 U.S.P.Q. 634 (C.C.P.A. 1966). In Reed, the junior party to an
interference proceeding was awarded priority because it had established by a preponderance of the evidence that its conception had occurred before the senior party
and that reasonable diligence had been exercised up to the time of the filing of its
application.
69. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 15-16.
70. Id. at 2-9.
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a different degree of proof. Therefore, the highest degree of proof
should be provided by complainant.
ANTICIPATION BY PUBLIC USE
In Tape Form7 1 three Commissioners found that the defense
of anticipation by prior public knowledge7 2 had not been established and, therefore, the subject patent was valid. The basis for
their finding was that insufficient evidence was offered to establish the qualities and critical parameters of the competing product.
Absent the required proof, the three Commissioners found that
the competing product was not known or used in the United
States prior to the conception of the invention disclosed by the
patent in issue.
FRAUD
In Tape Form, 3 three Commissioners found that the defense
of fraud had not been successfully established and, therefore,
the subject patent was valid. These Commissioners held that
the standard for proof of fraud defined in a recent decision of
74
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had not been met,
thereby suggesting that these Commissioners have adopted this
standard for the fraud defense.
CONCLUSION
The Act states that all patent defenses may be raised in
section 337 investigations. Although some have not yet been
raised before the Commission, it is clear that the usual patent
defenses may be asserted. 3 Careful attention must be paid to
the high burden of proof required by some Commissioners in
71. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 16-17.
72. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless - (a) the invention was known
or used by others in this country ... before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent ..
" 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1970).
73. Tape Form, supra note 36, at 16.
74. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 167 U.S.P.Q. 532 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
75. Certain patent defenses which have not yet been asserted include: misuse,
lack of novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970) ; absence of utility, id. § 101; non-statutory
subject matter, id. § 101; double patenting; prior invention, id. § 102; improper
reissue, id. § 251; non-enabling, id. § 112; non-specific, id. § 112 and inoperativeness, id. § 101. See supra notes 36 et seq. and accompanying text.
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order to raise defenses successfully. Some Commissioners attach
a greater importance to the presumption of validity of an issued
patent and, therefore, a greater measure of proof is required to
assert patent defenses successfully.
C.

INJURY

After establishing that an unfair method or act has occurred
and that the patent in issue is valid for section 337 purposes,
complainant must show that an injury has resulted. The injury
standards serve as the section 337 standing requirements since,
even if an unfair act or method is found, if none of the injury
standards are met, relief cannot be granted.
Section 337 specifies three standards under which an injury
may be found. 76 The first is when the unfair method or act has
".... the effect or tendency.., to destroy or substantially injure
an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States ... ." The second is when the unfair method or act has
".... the effect or tendency.., to present the establishment of
such an industry . . . ." ["efficiently and economically operated,
in the United States"]. The third is when the unfair method or
act has ".... the effect or tendency. .. to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States.. . ." The third injury standard relating to antitrust law is beyond the scope of
this article. 7 Only Commision determinations brought under
section 337, as amended, are analyzed in this article.
The Commission has stated that the amendment of section
337 did not lower the existing tendency standard and rejected
the suggestion that a lesser standard might apply. 78 Thus, "tend76. Section 337(a).
77. Id. The restraint or monopolization standard has not yet been asserted in a
patent-based investigation.
78. In Tape Form, supra note 36, three Commissioners who reached the injury
question stated:
Complainant Gore excepts to R.D. findings 35-37 on the ground that although the
1974 Trade Act (Public Law 93-618) retained the wording of the injury standard
under former section 337, language in the report of the Committee on Ways and
Means suggests that the standard is lower than a 'tendency . . .to destroy or
substantially injure.' We disagree and would therefore adopt Judge Rqenick's
position. In citing the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
we believe the Committee signaled that existing standards were to remain in
effect, even though they paraphrased language from the decision In re Von Clemm
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ency" to destroy or injure is required; a mere "effect" may be
insufficient.
In Ultra-Microtome0 and in Chain Door Locks80 the Commission reaffirmed its standard for United States industry as "the
domestic industry that is lawfully manufacturing the articles
that are the subject of [the] investigation."8' In patent-based
investigations, the industry may consist of the patentee and his
licensees, or even a single company.2 It must be noted that only
producers under the patent whose domestic products are within
the scope of the patent claims may satisfy this domestic industry
8 3 mere ownership or licensing
element. As in Ultra-Microtome,
of the patent is not sufficient.
No party has successfully disputed a complainant's assertion
that the domestic industry as defined was not being efficiently
and economically operated. In Chain Door Locks, s4 the Commission analyzed evidence on the complainant's level of automation
and production processes, as compared to the state-of-the-art in
the industry and found it sufficient to support their conclusion of
efficient and economic operation.
The "substantially injure" standard and the "prevention of
establishment" standard have been analyzed by the Commission.
The Commission has not yet considered a "destroy" allegation.
Substantial injury was found in Chain Door Locks 85 but was
not established in Tape Form.86 Three findings of fact are re[infra note 82] that might be construed to describe an even lower standard
than 'tendency' to destroy or substantially injure.

Id. at 18.

But see Commissioner Ablondi's dissent in Plastic Bags, supra note 36, at
20, where he stated that "[iut does not appear that such a small quantity of imports (1.5 percent of total U.S. production) could have the . . . tendency to
substantially injure the domestic industry." The majority in Plastic Bags found
this sufficient to constitute injury.
It appears, therefore, that the application of the tendency standard may be
less stringent on complainant than was stated in Tape Form, id.
79. Ultra-Microtorne,supra note 36, at 8-9.
80. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 35, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 285.
81. Id., citing In-the-Ear Hearing Aids, U.S.T.C. Pub. No. 182 (1966) at 20.
82. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 35, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 285, citing In re

Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 108 U.S.P.Q. at 375 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ultra-Microtome,supra note 36, at 8-9.
Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 36, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 286.
Id. at 33-42, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 284-88.
Tape Form,supra note 36, at 17-20.
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quired to support a conclusion of substantial injury. First, complainant must show that it had suffered a relative decline in
domestic sales of the patented products. In Chain Door Locks 7
complainant demonstrated a fifteen percent decline in its sales of
the patented product over a one-year period. Second, complainant must show that sales of infringing imports increased relatively during the same period. In Tape Form,8s staff-complied
evidence of an increase in sales of infringing imports amounting
to five percent of total United States consumption of the product,
both infringing and non-infringing, was found to be insufficient
for a finding of substantial injury. In Chain Door Locks89 data
introduced by complainant showed that sales of infringing imports increased 250% to 7% of total domestic sales of products
covered by the patents in issue; this was sufficient evidence for a
finding of substantial injury. Third, it should be demonstrated
by complainant that its relative decline in sales is not due to
corresponding increases in domestic sales of non-infringing competing products or other economic conditions unrelated to the
infringing imports. In situations where the domestic product
market consists solely of products covered by the patent in issue
and complainant is the sole producer, it is unnecessary to provide evidence that his relative losses in the total market are
due to non-infringing competition in order to satisfy the substantial injury requirement. In Chain Door Locks, 90 Department of
Commerce data introduced by complainant, showing an 18 percent increase in sales of all "Night Latches and Deadlocks," without regard to classification, was not analyzed. In fact, the Commission noted that "the actual levels of domestic non-infringing
lock sales is not of record."' 1 Yet, the Commission found that
complainant's lost sales were due to increased sales of infringing
imports and did not address the possibility of losses to domestic
non-infringing competitors. 2 In Tape Form, the Commission
noted that it received no evidence on "relative sales of the pipe
thread sealant industry . . . during the relevant period" 93 and
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 38, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 286.
Tape Form, supra note 36, at 19.
Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 40-41, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 287.
Id. at 37, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 286.
Id. at 40 n.1, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 287.
Id. at 40.
Tape Form, supranote 36, at 19.
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concluded that complainant had failed to show the requisite injury. It seems fundamental that the relation of complainant's
share of the product market to the total domestic product market
must be shown in order to conclude that complainant's losses are
due primarily to increased sales of infringing imports.
A respondent may not assert a defense based on a theory that
his infringing imports constitute a de minimis portion of the total
infringing imports which are found to injure complainant. In
Chain Door Locks the Commission noted that "[t]his Commission cannot require proof of injury arising from each patent
trespass; every infringing import is, at least potentially, the cause
of all the industry's hurt." 94 In that determination, complainant's
loss of sales was sufficient alone to constitute injury.
The "prevention of establishment" standard protects "embryo" and "infant" industries. An infant industry has been
defined as one which has recently begun domestic manufacture
of a patented product but this situation has never been considered
by the Commission.95 An embryo industry has been defined as
one not yet domestically manufacturing under a patent. In UltraMicrotome96 the embryo industry exception was crucial to the
finding that no injury had occurred. Although an embryo industry is one which is not yet manufacturing a patented product in
the United States, a showing of readiness to commence production
will permit a finding of injury to such a domestic non-producer.
The complainant in Ultra-Microtome was the exclusive licensee
of a patent owned by its foreign subsidiary. Complainant imported the patented product manufactured by its subsidiary and
had decided to begin domestic manufacture under its license. The
Commission found that complainant's commitment of funds for
development and domestic market research was an insufficient
showing of readiness to commence production. 7
D. REMEDY
The Commission must decide upon an appropriate remedy
after an unfair method or act and an injury are found. Two
94. Chain Door Locks, supranote 36, at 39, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 287.

95. Ultra-Microtome, supra note 36, at 9-14.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 15.
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remedies are available: a cease and desist order against a named
person 9s and an exclusion order against infringing imports. 9
Exclusion orders have been issued in Chain Door Locks and
Plastic Bags.100
The Commission must consider the public interest in relation to each proposed remedy. The Commission is required to
consider the effect of a proposed remedy upon "the public health
and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy,
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the
United States, and United States consumers."''1 1 The Commission's consultations with the Departments of Justice and HEW
and the FTC, as well as other departments and0 2 agencies, will
enter into its determination of the public interest.
In ChainDoor Locks, only the Department of Justice replied
to the Commission's solicitation and stated that the effect of the
proposed exclusion order was not such that the order should be
basis to
denied. 0 3 The Commission found no public interest
04

refuse issuance of the proposed exclusion order.'
The question of what constitutes a public interest consideration sufficient to override a patent violation under section 337
98. Section 337(f). The Commissioner has not yet published guidelines pertaining
to enforcement procedures for either remedy.
A cease and desist order may be modified or revoked by the Commission at
any time "upon such notice and in such manner as it deems proper." Two points must
be made. This subsection has no counterpart in subsection (d) and (e) pertaining
to exclusion orders. The section is silent as to whether presidential review is required
after such modification or revocation by the Commission. Since this may occur "at
any time," it is possible that the Commission could amend its cease and desist order

after the period for Presidential review has expired. See also infra note 114.
The questions remains of how a cease and desist order may be enforced. The
Commission is not empowered to seek enforcement of its order under Section 337 in
Article III courts, as for example, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to
seek enforcement of its orders. See, e.g., The Finality Act of 1959, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §
21 (1970). Thus, it appears that a cease and desist order cannot be enforced. The
only available "enforcement mechanism" is for the Commission to modify or revoke
the order. In the case of revocation, the Commission may issue an exclusion order.

Section 337 (f).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Section 337(d).
ChainDoor Locks and Plastic Bags, supra note 36.
Section 337(a).
Ultra-Microtome,supra note 36, at 9-14.
Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 43, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 288.
Id.
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remains; the scope and degree of public interest considerations
is unclear. The Commission has stated that it does not perceive
that Congress intended the policy of patent monopoly to override
the public interest considerations in every case. 105 Chairman
Leonard noted that if the proposed remedy would have an adverse impact on any of the public interest considerations that
is greater than the benefit of the remedy to the complainant, then
the remedy should be denied. 10 6
Infringing imports "shall be entitled to entry under bond
determined by the Commission"' 0 7 during the 60 day period following the Commission's determination. In the "reason to believe" phase, after which a Temporary Exclusion Order may issue,
a bond is required until completion of the full investigation. 08
In Chain Door Locks'0 9 the Commission set bond at 50 percent of the value of the infringing imports, f.o.b. foreign port.
The Commission applied the standard suggested in the Report of
the Senate Finance Committee:
In determining the amount of the bond, the Commission shall
determine, to the extent possible, the amount which would
offset any competitive advantage resulting from the unfair
method of competition or unfair act enjoyed by persons benefiting from the importation of the article." 0
The Commission found that the traditional full-value bond was
no longer to be applied automatically, but, rather, was to be set
on a case-by-case basis. In Plastic Bags, a 100 percent bond was
found appropriate."'
The exclusion order in Chain Door Locks' 12 is very broad in
scope. It appears to apply not only to the infringing imports
105. Id.
106. Remarks of Will E. Leonard, supra note 7.
107. Section 337(g) (3).
108. Section 337(e).
109. Chain Door Locks, supra note 36, at 44, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 288-89.
110. Id.
111. Plastic Bags, supra note 36, at 16.
112. Chain Door Locks and Plastic Bags, supra note 36. Briefly, the orders
exclude from entry any article made in accordance with the claims of the patent in
issue - for the life of the patent upon publication of notice in the Federal Register,
except articles imported under license from the patent holder.
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found to have violated section 337 according to the Commission's
determination but to "[a]rticles made in accordance with any
claims or combination of claims (of the patent in issue), imported
by any person (which) shall hereafter until the expiration of such
Letters Patent be excluded from entry into the United States." 3
Thus the exclusion order will apply to any imported article which
may, in the future, infringe any claim in any patent which is part
of the order.
E. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
All Commission determinations which find a violation and
order a remedy must be submitted to the President for review."-'
The President may, for policy reasons, disapprove the determination and any remedy proposed thereunder will not go into effect.
If the President decides that the proposed order should not go
into effect within the 60 day time limit, the remedy has no force
or effect, even though the finding of violation still stands. In
effect, both the President and the Commission can find that a
remedy is not warranted despite a finding of violation.
If the President takes no action within the time period, the
Commission determination is left to stand and the proposed
remedy remains in effect. In Chain Door Locks, the President
took no action and the proposed order remained in effect.1 15
113. ChainDoor Locks, supranote 36.
114. Section 337(g). The statute empowers the President to disapprove a Commission determination but both the statute and the legislative history are silent as to
whether the President may modify a Commission order.
The absence of specific authority is strong evidence that modification is not
permitted. This absence should be contrasted to section 201 of 1974 Trade Act, 19
U.S.C. § 2251, pertaining to antidumping investigations by the Commission. The
President may modify Commission orders in such determinations under section 202,
but the Congress retains the veto power over such Presidential modification under
section 203 of the Act. The absence of comparable powers in section 337 determination suggests a congressional intent that the President may not modify Commission orders under section 337.
115. In Plastic Bags, supra note 36, the 60-day time period expired without
presidential action and the Commission's exclusion order remained in effect. See
text at supra note 25.
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IV. RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
This section examines the current Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Commission 116 which pertain to section 337
investigations (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). There are
two basic characteristics to the Rules. First, applicable sections
of the Rules closely parallel provisions in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure" 7 (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Rules).
This reduces the time required for counsel to learn the Rules.
Second, there are short time periods provided at all stages of an
investigation. This was deemed necessary in view of the urgency
of concluding investigations within the limitations specified in
section 337.118 The following discussion examines the Rules and

points out the differences, if any, between corresponding sections
of the Rules and the Federal Rules.
A.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
The Commission has its principal office in Washington,

D.C.,'

9

and a branch office in New York City.

20

All communica-

tions to the Commission should be addressed to its Washington,
D.C. office.' 21 The Commission is open during normal business
116. At the time of passage of the Trade Act, there was an existing set of Rules
of Practice and Procedure, 19 C.F.R. Chapter 11 (1976). The U.S.I.T.C. promulgated
extensive amendments and additions to the existing Rules which became effective
May 27, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 17710 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II).
Subsequently, provisions concerning confidential business information and initiation
of investigations were promulgated, effective August 13, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 28950
(1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II).
For a useful analysis of the new Rules of Practice and Procedure, excepting
the later amendments, see remarks of G. Franklin Rothwell, Esq. to the Third Annual
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, May
10, 1976, 72 F.R.D. 239, 260 (1977). See also supra notes 7, 106.
117. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. (1970), as amended.
118. 41 Fed. Reg.17710 (1976).
119. 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.3(a)
E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20436.

(1976).

The Commission's address is 701

120. Id. The branch office is in the Custom House, No. 6 World Trade Center,
Room 22629, New York, New York 10048.
121. Id. § 201.3(b). The mailing address is: United States International Trade
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20436.

TopIcAL SURVEY
provisions permitting filing of papers
hours122 and there are 2no
8
outside of those hours.1

The Commission may meet and exercise its powers at any
place provided that there is a quorum present when a vote is
taken.124 Moreover, the Commission may prosecute any inquiry

in any part of the United
necessary to fulfill its statutory 1duties
25
States or in any foreign country.

The Commission retains the authority to interpret the rules
that it promulgates and the laws applicable to it.126 When the
Commission determines there is "good and sufficient reason" for
doing so, it may amend, waive, suspend or revoke its promulgated
rules in any particular Commission proceeding. 27
Attendance fees and mileage costs of deponents and witnesses are treated in a fashion similar to that in United States
federal courts.28
B. INSTITUTION OF AN INVESTIGATION
A section 337 investigation may be initiated by a private
person 29 or any of several governmental units including the Commission. 130 The investigation is commenced by filing a complaint
with the Commission. 3 ' In contrast to the Federal Rules, 13 2 a
122. Id. § 201.3(c). "The hours . . . are from 8:45 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. eastern
standard [time]."
123. 41 Fed. Reg. 17710 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.8).
124. 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.4(a). A majority of the members of the Commission constitute a quorum.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 201.4(c).
127. Id. § 201.4(b). This section of the Rules was promulgated prior to amendment of section 337 by the Trade Act. Because of the adjudicative nature of Commission investigations, it is conceivable that use of this provision could raise due process
problems in the future. However, this section may be essential in some situations in
order that the Commission may satisfy the time periods required by section 337.
128. 41 Fed. Reg. 17711 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.5).
129. Section 337(b). 41 Fed. Reg. 28951 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.7) ; 41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II,
§ 210.10(a)).
130. 41 Fed Reg. 28951 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter 11, § 201.7);
41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 210.10(b)).
131. 41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.10(a)).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
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complaint must include a considerable amount of evidence, including certain documents and exhibits, in order to be sufficient
under the Rules.133 The complaint functions as a pleading, which

sets out the requisite elements for a finding of violation of section 337, and as a discovery device for assembling certain evidence
essential to the completion of the investigation. A complaint under the Rules is significantly different from the notice pleading
of the Federal Rules because it requires much more specific information and detail. Certain requirements are, for example, a
description of the domestic industry affected, 13 4 a description of
complainant's business, 13 5 detailed economic data on the domestic
industry and its patented product' 6 and, for each patent for
8
which infringement is alleged, information in its ownership,
all domestic and foreign licensees, 38 corresponding foreign patents
to specific claims
and patent applications' 39 and specific references
40
in the patent in issue alleged to infringed.
The signer of a complaint must swear to it and, if any
matter in the complaint is subsequently revealed to be false, the
signer may be impeached. It has been advised that the complaint
141
be laced with "information and beliefs" to avoid this difficulty.

Counsel for complainant should take great pains to comply
with all of the detailed requirements of the Rules relative to
the complaint. Consultation with Commission attorneys is recommended; 142 their informal and unofficial advice relative to suffi-

ciency will aid counsel in avoiding this problem. The Commission
is harsh on errors and omissions because it views the complaint
as having a vital role to play in meeting the time periods specified
133. 41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.20) specifies in great detail the required contents of a patent-based complaint,
including the submission of articles as exhibits when "practical and possible."
134. Id. § 210.20(a) (6).

§ 21020(a) (7).
135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. § 210.20(a) (8).
Id. § 210.20 (a) (9) (B).
Id. § 210.20 (a) (9) (C), (E).
Id. § 210.20 (a) (9) (D).
Id. § 210.20(a) (9) (G).
See Rothwell, supra note 116.
Id.
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will not be instituted until the
in section 337. The investigation
143
complaint is found sufficient.

Upon receipt of the complaint, the Commission has thirty
days to determine whether it has been properly filed.14 4 During
this time, the complaint is examined for sufficiency and compliance with the applicable provisions of the Rules, 4 5 and relevant
sources of information pertaining to the investigation are researched. 46 During this period, the complaint may be amended
without leave of the Commission. 7 By filing the complaint on
Friday, the statutory time period is effectively increased by three
days. If the Commission determines that the complaint is deficient, the complaint is dismissed and the Commission must
who filed the complaint and give reanotify in writing the person
148
sons for the dismissal.

If the Commission determines that the complaint is properly
filed and states a cause of action, a notice is published in the
Federal Register which defines the scope of the investigation.'49
The investigation is formally instituted by the publication of the
notice. 10 It should be noted that the publication of the notice
starts the running of the time period within which the investigation must be completed as specified in section 337: '"1 it is not
143. The Senate Report states:
[I]t is the intent of the Committee that an investigation be commenced by the
Commission as soon as possible after receipt of a properly filed petition, but it
is not the intent of the Committee to compel the Commission to institute an investigation before it has had an adequate opportunity to identify sources of relevant information, assure itself of the availability thereof, and, if deemed necessary,
prepare subpoenas therefor, and to give attention to other preliminary matters.
Senate Report at 7327.
144. 41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.12). In exceptional circumstances, the time period may be lengthened. All documents, if properly filed, are deemed filed on the date when they are actually received
at the Commission. Id. § 201.8(a).
145. Id. § 210 .11(a).
146. Id. § 210.11(b).
147. Id. § 210.20(d).
148. Id. § 210.12. This does not appear to be a dismissal with prejudice and,
therefore, there is nothing to prevent complainant from filing a second complaint which
corrects the deficiencies in the first.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 210.15. A "simple" investigation must be concluded and a final order
issued no later than 12 months after the date of publication of notice. The Commission may designate an investigation as "more complicated" when it involves complex
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the date of infringement by the imported product that begins
the running of the statutory time period. 15 2 This should be contrasted to the requirement in federal courts that a suit be filed
prior to the running of the statute of limitation, but that once filed
there is no mandatory time period in which the case must be
decided. This concept that the time period specified in section
337 only begins running when the investigation is instituted,
however, should be kept clearly in mind by counsel.

Once the investigation has been instituted, the complaint 1 and
of good cause. 53

notice may only be amended upon a showing
A motion to amend the complaint and notice must be made to
the presiding officer of the investigation. The presiding officer, if
not the Commission, must certify the motion for amendment to
the Commission for its ultimate determination. In making his
determination, the presiding officer must consider both the public

interest and the rights of the parties. 5 4 Throughout the Rules the

public interest is considered equal to the interests of the parties.
Immediately after the publication of the notice, the Commission must serve a copy of the complaint and notice on each
named respondent. 15 Service of process under the Rules is different in some respects from the Federal Rules. 56 Several named
federal departments and agencies must also be served at this
stage, and the Commission may serve other departments and
subject matter, difficulty in obtaining information or a large number of parties. The
reasons for such an investigation must be included in the published notice. A "more
complicated" investigation must be concluded and a final order issued no later than
18 months after the date of publication of notice.
152. The dates of importation of an infringing product may be important with

relation to the possible remedies, since the Commission may decide to order only a

cease and desist order when all the imported products are no longer infringing the
subject patent. With respect to the patent defense of laches, the date of importation
of the infringing products is important. But see supra note 42.

153. 41 Fed. Reg. 17713 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.10(d)). "Good cause" is defined by the rules as "such conditions as are neces-

sary to avoid prejudicing the public interest and the rights of the parties."
154. Id. § 210.22(a). See also Leonard, supra note 7.
155. Id. § 210.13.

156. Id. § 201.16. Specifically, service of process may be made by any method

ordered by the Commission including service by mail or by any person appointed by
the Commission. Cf. FE.D. R. Civ. P. 4.
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agencies that it deems appropriate in a particular investigation. 157
Additional respondents may be joined during the proceeding and
they must be served immediately with a copy of the complaint
and notice. 158
C. RESPONSE
Beginning with the date of service of process, a respondent
has twenty days in which to file a written response. 159 An exception to this time limit may be specified in the notice or permitted
by the presiding officer.
If a respondent fails to file a written response within the
time period, the presiding officer may regard this as a default 6"
and, without further notice to the respondent, find for the complainant.' If the presiding officer is not the Commission, he must
recommend a finding of default to the Commission for its final
action.
The required contents of the written response are similar to
those in an answer under the Federal Rules. 162 Specifically, the
response must address each allegation in the complaint and notice.
Each fact alleged in the complaint and notice must be admitted
or denied or a statement of lack of knowledge must be made.
If this is not done, the alleged fact is deemed admitted. In contrast to the Federal Rules, particular data on the quantity and
value of imports of the alleged infringing import must be included
when available. 168 A concise statement of the facts constituting
each defense must be set forth. 64 When the noninfringement
patent defense is asserted, a detailed showing of noninfringement
of each claim of the subject patent must be provided. Likewise,
when the defense of patent invalidity or misuse is asserted, a de157. 41 Fed. Reg. 17712 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.13). The named federal departments and agencies are the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 210.21 (a).
160. Id. §210.21(d).
161. Id. § 210.51(b), (c). A default may be ordered against one or more
respondents.
162. Id. § 210.21(b).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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tailed analysis of the claims must be provided along with a copy
of any prior art relied upon in the defense. Charts and other
visual aids augmenting the defense may be appended and the
Commission "encourages" such aids. 165 Submission of the alleged
infringing import as an exhibit is required when practical and
possible.'6 6
Transactions, occurrences, or events taking place after the
filing of the response which are relevant to any issue in the
investigation may become part of the record through a motion
for supplemental submission. 167 The presiding officer may allow
the motion where notice is given and the terms are reasonable.
The response may be amended if good cause is shown. 168
Issues not specifically raised by the complaint and notice,
but which are reasonably within the scope of the investigation,
may become part of the investigation either through express or
implied consent of the parties. 169 Amendment to the pleadings to
investigation may be made at any
incorporate the issues into the 70
investigation.
time during the
D. MOTIONS
Written motions may be filed at any time during the investigation unless otherwise specified in the Rules. Motions must be
addressed to the presiding officer of the investigation and served
upon each party.'' When the presiding officer is the Commission,
it can rule on all written motions. When the administrative law
judge is presiding, he may rule on any motion within his authority, but can only make a recommended ruling to the Commission for its final determination. The sole exception to this
rule is on a motion for extension7 2of time; the presiding officer
may rule ex parte on this motion.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 210.23.
Id. § 210.22 (a). See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
Id. § 210.22(b).
Id.
Id. § 210.24 (a).
Id. § 210.24(d).
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An opposing party has ten days in which to answer the
motion, unless otherwise specified. 173 Failure to answer is viewed
as consent to the motion by the opposing party. The moving
party is not permitted to reply to an answer.
E.

DISCOVERY

These sections of the Rules closely correspond to provisions
in the Federal Rules. For this reason, only the differences between the two are analyzed here.
The only discovery method present in the Federal Rules
which is not present in the Rules is physical and mental examination. All other discovery methods are present in the Rules.'74
The scope of discovery is as broad as allowed in the Federal Rules
and lack of admissibility alone is not a ground for objection.
The discovery of privileged material is, however, objectionable. The standard for privilege in the Rules is different from
the Federal Rules. Under the Federal Rules and case law, attorney work product is discoverable "only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means."'-7 5 However, under the Rules, the presiding officer
has wide discretion and may place limits upon the kind and
amount of discovery. 7 6 A finding of privilege by the presiding
officer puts the material beyond the scope of discovery since there
is no provision comparable to the substantial need and hardship
exception in the Federal Rules. The wide discretion granted
the presiding officer is probably due to the required balancing of
the public interest with the rights of the parties and the severe
time limits of the investigation.
The presiding officer also has wide discretion in determining
the period of time within which discovery must be carried out,
within the time limits for completion of the investigation specified
in section 337.177
173. Id. § 210.24(c).
174. Id. § 210.30. Cf. FFD.R.Civ. P.26.
175. FED.R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).

176. 41 Fed. Reg. 17714 (1976)
210.30 (c)).
177. Id.

(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
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Protective orders are available under the Rules which are
identical to the Federal Rules provisions, with one exception.
Under the Rules, a protective order may issue on the grounds of
public interest. 78
It should be noted that discovery of trial preparation of
experts is not specifically covered in the Rules.17 9 The presiding

officer, therefore, has wide discretion over such information.
Supplementation of responses under the Rules is identical
to the Federal Rules. 80
Depositions upon oral examination or written questions may
be taken after institution of the investigation.' 8' Certain differences between the Rules and the corresponding provisions of the
Federal Rules are notable.
Leave of the presiding officer must be obtained to take a
deposition within the twenty day period following service of the
complaint and 182notice as compared with thirty days under the
Federal Rules.

Written notice to a deponent must be given at least ten days
prior to a deposition in the United States and at least fifteen
days prior to a deposition outside the United States. 83 ThiS
specificity is contrasted to the reasonable notice requirement of
the Federal Rules"" and can be attributed to the time limits of
section 337.
Any adverse party under the Rules has the right to crossexamine the deponent 8 5 and is only limited therein by the evidence section of the Rules.8 8 In contrast, under the Federal
Rules,'8 7 examination and cross-examination of a witness is

limited to that allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

8

178. Id. § 210.30(d). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
179. Id.§ 210.30(b), (c). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4).
180. 41 Fed. Reg. 17714 (1976)

(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II,

§

210.30(e)). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
181. 41 Fed. Reg. 17714 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.31). See FED. R. Civ. P. 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32. There is no comparable section to
FED. R. Civ. P. 27.
182. 41 Fed. Reg. 17714 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.31(a)). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
183. 41 Fed. Reg. 17714 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.31 (c)).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
185. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.31 (d)).
186. Id. 41 Fed. Reg. 28951 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.6).
187. FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(c).
188. FED. R. Evm. 611(b).
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Confidential business data need not be disclosed at deposition and no exclusionary motion to the presiding officer is required. 8 9 Under the Federal Rules, a motion to terminate or
limit examination is required. 90
A transcribed and attested copy of a deposition must be sent
automatically to each party. 1 '
Depositions or document discovery from officers or employees
of the Federal Government, other than the Commission, is specifically permitted by the Rules. 192 Pursuant to a written motion to
the presiding officer for an appropriate subpoena, discovery will
be granted only if the information sought falls within the scope of
discovery and cannot be obtained by alternative means without
undue hardship. 19 3 The Commission, therefore, can control parties' access to other government officials and thereby avoid conflict or harassment.
Written interrogatories to any party may be propounded under the Rules.-9 4 In contrast to the Federal Rules, 195 answers and
objections must be filed within ten days.
Requests for production and inspection of documents may
be served on any party. 196 In contrast
to the Federal Rules, a
97
ten day time limit is applicable.

Requests for admissions may be served on any party. 98 In
contrast to the Federal Rules, 199 the party must respond within
ten days.200 Failure to respond "may" result in automatic admis189. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 210.31
(d)) ; 41 Fed. Reg. 28951 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 201.6).
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
191. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 210.31
(d)). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f) (2). The party taking the deposition must supply two
copies to the Commission investigative attorney.
192. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976)
(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §

210.31 (e)).
193. Id.

194. Id. § 210.32.
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
196. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 210.33).
Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
197. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976)
(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.33 (b) (2)).

198. Id. § 210.34. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.

199. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
200. 41 Fed. Reg. 17716 (1976)
210.34 (b)).

(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II,

§
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sion. 20 1 In contrast to the Federal Rules, 20 2 this admission is not,

apparently, automatic. This may be a realistic view of such requests in light of the short time limits in the Rules.
Requests for admissions may be served upon the complainant
immediately after institution of the investigation but may be
served on all other parties only after
the first twenty days from
2 03
the institution of the investigation.

Two different types of subpoenas are available for discovery
purposes under the Rules.20 4 A subpoena may not be used to expand the scope of discovery in order to obtain privileged documents.2 0 5 All motions for subpoenas may be ruled upon by the
presiding officer whether or not he is the Commission.2 0° The

scope of the issued subpoena must be precise and limited in
necessary degree so as to protect the public interest. No subpoena
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act may be entertained
by the presiding officer. 20 7 A motion to limit or quash a subpoena
208

must be filed within ten days after service of the subpoena.
Ex parte rulings on application for subpoenas are available.2 0 9
A motion for order compelling discovery may be filed with
the presiding officer after reasonable notice to other parties and
all persons who will be affected thereby. 0 If the motion is
granted and the subpoena or order is not complied with, the
movant may seek relief from the presiding officer. 211 Several

types of relief are specified in the Rules, including specific granting of portions of a recommended determination
or federal court
21 2
enforcement of the subpoena or order.

It is clear that the Commission has powerful sanctions to
compel discovery. 13 It is unclear, however, what effect resort to
201. Id. § 210.34(c).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
203. 41 Fed. Reg. 17715 (1976)
(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
2
01.34 (a)).
204. Id. § 210.35. The available subpoenas are a subpoena ad testificandum and
a subpoena duces tecum.
205. Id. § 210.35(b).
206. Id. § 210.35(c) (2).
207. Id. § 2 10.35(c) (3).
208. Id. § 210.35(d).
209. Id. § 210.35(e).
210. Id. § 210.36(a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
211. 41 Fed. Reg. 17716 (1976)
(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.36(b)).

212. Id. § 210.36(b) (5).

213. The Commission itself may enforce discovery in federal court. 19 U.S.C.

§ 1333(g) (1970).

TopicAL SURVEY

federal court enforcement will have on the statutory time limits
in section 337.
F. HEARINGS AND PREHEARING CONFERENCES
The presiding officer is delegated broad prehearing conference

powers in order to expedite the investigation. 214 These powers

correspond to the discretionary powers in the Federal Rules.215
The prehearing conference is an important method for conformity
to the time limits of section 337.
All orders at a prehearing conference are entered on the
record, and
may be modified only upon a showing of manifest
21 6
injustice.

An opportunity for a hearing must be provided in all phases
of an investigation under section 337. The Administrative Procedure Act is applicable to these hearings. All hearings are public,
unless otherwise ordered by the presiding officer.21 7
Certain time limits exist within which hearings must be concluded, subject to change only by the Commission. 218

In the

"reason to believe" phase, the hearing must be completed within three months of the institution of the investigation. In a full
investigation, hearings must be completed within seven months
of the institution of the investigation. In a "more complicated"
investigation, hearings must be completed within twelve months
of the institution of the investigation. These time periods, therefore, specify the time limits for discovery.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable to a section
337 investigation. A specific provision of the Rules follows the
general intent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but is less specific
in its language.2

19

Specifically, the proponent of any factual propo-

sition must meet the burden of proof on that proposition. Evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, material and reliable.
Notice of any material fact not appearing in evidence of record
may be taken by the presiding officer, and every party must be
given an opportunity to disprove the notice fact by timely motion. Objections to evidence must be made in a timely fashion,
214. 41 Fed. Reg. 17717 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 210.40).
215. Id. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
216. 41 Fed Reg. 17717 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.40(d)).
217. Id. § 210.41(d).
218. Id. § 210.41(e).
219. Id. § 210.42. Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence is within the discretion of
the presiding officer.

234

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

and the grounds on which the objection is based must be briefly
stated on the record. All rulings on objections must be on the
record, and formal exceptions to rulings are not required. When
an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained,
an offer of proof may be made. All rejected exhibits are part of
the record so as to be available for consideration by a reviewing
authority.
Two interesting aspects of this section should be noted.
First, the Commission investigative staff may submit into evidence
any materials or information obtained by the Commission under
any of its powers. 220 Since the Commission has broad investiga-

tive powers, this provision could have substantial significance.
Second, the section is silent as to whether evidence obtained in
one investigation may be admitted into another investigation.
It seems that the Commission staff could introduce evidence from
one investigation in another because of its active role in the proceedings. It is not clear that a party could do the same without
the broad powers of the Commission.
Transcripts of the hearings are part of the record. 2 1 The
record must be certified to the Commission by the presiding
officer upon his filing of a recommended determination or at an
earlier time if the Commission so orders.
Documents and testimony may be placed on the in camera
record of the Commission to secure confidential treatment.2

22

In

order to obtain confidential treatment of evidence, a party must
file a motion which sets forth justification for confidential treatment. If the presiding officer finds good cause for confidential
treatment, he must issue an order which specifies the scope and
length of time of the confidential treatment. However, it must
be noted that confidential material may be disclosed by the presiding officer, the Commission or courts of review to any extent
necessary to properly disposed of the investigation.223
Confidential treatment is especially important during the
period between the filing of the complaint and the institution of
the investigation. It is not clear which section of the Rules
applies during this phase. If this phase is considered to be part
of an adjudicatory proceeding, the section discussed in the previ220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 41
210.44 (a)).

§ 210.42(c).
§ 210.43.
§ 210.44.
Fed. Reg. 17717

(1976)

(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II,

§
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ous paragraph above is applicable. If, however, this phase is regarded as nonadjudicatory, a more restrictive section is applicable.
The test for confidentiality of information in nonadjudicatory
proceedings has several facets. First, if the Commission is required by law to disclose the information, then this provision of
the Rules cannot be used to circumvent the required disclosure.2
Second, if the Commission determines that disclosure of the information is likely to impair the Commission's ability to obtain
such information which is necessary to perform its statutory
function, then the information can be defined as confidential.2 25
Third, if the Commission determines that disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the source of the information then the information
226
can be defined as confidential.
The Commission views the protection of confidential information very seriously. Serious sanctions are available for breach of
this confidentiality by either Commission staff227 or counsel for
22 8
any party.
A summary determination may be had upon motion for any
issue in the investigation.2 29 A motion for summary determination
may be made by complainant twenty days after the institution of
the investigation and by all other parties immediately after the
institution of the investigation. This motion must be filed at least
thirty days before the date fixed for any hearing in the investigation. Supporting affidavits must set forth admissible facts to
which the affiant is competent to testify. Supplementation of
affidavits and oppositions by depositions or further affidavits may
be permitted by the presiding officer. Any nonmoving party must
file opposition within ten days of service, including any affidavit
requesting additional time or discovery in order to oppose the
motion. Oral argument and submission of briefs or memoranda
may be requested by either party or the presiding officer. The
opposing party cannot rely on mere allegations or denials in his
224. 41 Fed. Reg. 28951 (1976)
225. Id.

226. Id.

(to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 20 1.6(a)).

227. 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, § 200.735-113(f) (1976).
228. Beyond the possible harm that might result to his client's position in the investigation, improper treatment of confidential information by counsel may result in
disbarment before the U.S.I.T.C. or may open counsel to a malpractice action by
his client.
229. 41 Fed. Reg. 17718 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II. §

210.50)).
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pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue of fact for hearing.
If a partial summary determination is granted, the presiding
officer must file an order specifying the facts that are established
and directing further proceedings in the investigation. 230 A full

summary determination is treated the same as any final determination. 3 '
An investigation may be terminated upon the motion of any

party at any time during an investigation. 232 A motion to ter-

minate may relate to any or all issues in the investigation as to
one or more, but not all, of the respondents or to some issues as
to all respondents.23 3 It is not clear whether an investigation can

be terminated on all issues as to all respondents. If the motion is
granted, the order of termination
is a final determination, which
234
is treated as discussed above.

Prior to a final determination, any party may file proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law at certain specified times

in the investigation with the presiding officer.2 35 The specified

times are the close of the reception of evidence, a default finding
as to any party, the filing of a motion for summary determination,
or the filing of a motion for termination.
The proposals must be in writing and contain adequate references to the record and authorities relied upon. Proposals must
be served on each party. The presiding officer must rule on each
proposed finding and conclusion on the record.238
When the presiding officer is not the Commission, the presiding officer must certify the record to the Commission and file
23
his recommended determination within a specified time period.
The recommended determination must be filed with the Commission within thirty days after the date of filing of a motion for
summary determination, a motion for termination or a default
finding as to any party. The recommended determination must
be filed with the Commission within thirty days after completion
of the reception of evidence at a hearing in the "reason to believe"
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. § 210.50(e).
Id. § 210.50(f).
Id. § 210.51.
Id. § 210.51 (a).
Id. § 210.51 (c).
Id. § 210.52.
Id.
Id. § 210.53.
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phase, or within sixty days after completion of the reception of
evidence at a hearing in the full investigation. The presiding
officer may file a written request for an extension of time with
the Commission. This seems likely to occur, especially in a "more
.complicated" investigation.
The recommended determination must address all material
issues of fact, law, or discretion on the record and must contain
a finding of fact and conclusion of law for each material issue and
reasons and basis therefor.2 38 Citations to the record must be
present and a finding must be made as to whether or not a violation of section 337 has been established.
The presiding officer may reopen the proceeding for the reception of additional evidence prior to the filing of the recommended determination. 23 9 A copy of each recommended determination filed with the Commission must be served on each party
to the investigation.
It is within the discretion of the presiding officer to permit
parties to file exceptions and alternate findings of fact and conclusions of law within ten days of service of the recommended
determination of the presiding officer.2 0 If the exceptions and
alternate findings of fact and conclusions of law are permitted,
they must include satisfactory references to the record and the
law relied upon.
When the Commission is the presiding officer, the Commission must make a determination and order any appropriate action
to be taken, subject to presidential review, within the time period
specified in section 337 for conclusion of an investigation.241 The
Rules do not state in detail what must be contained in the Commission determination. Based on recent Commission determinations, the requirements of a recommended determination of a
presiding officer are followed by the Commission.
When a violation of section 337 has been found, the Commission must include the type and form of the action to be ordered,
and the amount of any bond required in its determination.
When the presiding officer is not the Commission, the Commission must review all material received from the presiding officer
and make a determination and order any appropriate action to
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. § 210.53(b).
Id. § 210.53 (d).
Id. § 210.54.
Id. § 210.55.
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be taken. 42 Once a Commission determination is rendered, the
determination must be served upon each party to the investi43
2

gation.

Any party may, within fourteen days of service of a Commission determination, file a petition for reconsideration.2 4 The
petition may address only questions raised by the determination
or actions or orders on which petitioner had no opportunity to
submit argument. The petition must state the relief requested
and the grounds in support thereof.
Any party may file an opposition to the petition
within five
245
days of the service of the petition upon that party.

The filing of a petition for reconsideration does not stay the
effective date of the determination or action ordered, nor does it
toll the running of any time period under the Act, unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
The power to affirm, repeal, or modify any determination or
order is retained by the Commission.246
G. APPEALS
Interlocutory appeals may not be taken to the Commission
prior to the issuance of the recommended determination of the
presiding officer, when it is not the Commission, except in certain
circumstances.
242. Id. § 210.55(a).
243. Id. §210.55(c).
244. Id. § 210.56.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 210.57.
247. Id. § 210.60. In Import Motors Limited, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission, 530 F.2d 937, 188 U.S.P.Q. 102 (C.C.P.A. 1975), appellants filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from an order
oi the Presiding Commissioner which discontinued appellants as respondents during
the violation determination, i.e., section 337(a), portion of the investigation. The
court, in this decision, granted a stay of further proceedings.
Appellants were independent distributors of German automobiles containing
monolithic catalytic converters which allegedly infringed complainant's patents. When
the investigation was instituted, the relation of appellants to the importer was uncertain. Appellants, along with the German manufacturer and the importer, were named
as respondents in the complaint and notice published at 40 Fed. Reg. 30879 (1975).
Each appellant filed a response to the complaint. Subsequently, however, the Commission found that appellants were corporate entities independent and separate from
each other and from the manufacturer and the importer.
The notice set a "reason to believe" hearing on a temporary exclusion or
cease and desist order. Prior to the hearing, appellants by order of the presiding
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Leave of the presiding officer may be requested and, if
granted, an interlocutory appeal may be taken to the Commission
on two grounds. An appeal from a ruling which involves "a controlling question of law or policy as to which there is substantial
Commission were discontinued as respondents during the violation portion of the
investigation, but were granted the right without prejudice to intervene later during the
remedy, i.e., sections 337(d), (e) and (f) portion of the investigation. The full Commission affirmed the order. Appellants appealed prior to the violation hearing by
the Commission.
The court found appellants had a right of interlocutory appeal, pursuant to
section 337(c), because they had a reasonable chance of success on appeal from the
order which could adversely affect their interests. The court noted that it would not
ordinarily entertain an appeal of an interlocutory order prior to a final determination
by the Commission and submissions by both parties. The reluctance of the court to
interfere in procedural and discretionary decisions of the Commission prior to a final
determination was overcome in this case by overriding considerations of due process
since appellants would have been irreparably harmed by deprivation of an effective
appeal, as provided in section 337(c). The court also noted that it could entertain this
appeal pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
The court held that it is not necessary for appellants to come within one of
the classes of owner, importer, consignee or agent of either specified in section 337
in order to participate in the violation hearing. The court rejected the Commission's
"necessary" party limitation since it did not comport with the language and spirit
of
the A.P.A. The court found that participation of all appellants in the violation hearing would not unduly burden the ability of the Commission to meet the statutory time
period because appellants were all represented by one local counsel. Moreover, the
Commission's power to exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence
would aid in an expeditious decision. The court seemed concerned by the Commission's sudden reversal after its specifying appellants as respondents in the complaint and notice.
The court found that an order compelling the Commission to allow respondents to participate in the violation hearing would be inadequate since appellants
had been denied discovery after issuance of the termination order by the Commissioner.
Instead, the court granted a stay of further proceedings pending final disposition
of the appeal.
In the decision of Import Motors Limited, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission, 530 F.2d 940, 188 U.S.P.Q. 490 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Markey, C.J.), the
court reversed and vacated the stay of further proceedings, holding:
[T]hat there has been neither an express 'final determination of the Commission under subsection (d) or (e),' within the meaning of § 337(c) or an action
with respect to the appellants which has the effect of such a final determination.
Under those circumstances, appellants have no present right of appeal to this court.
530 F.2d at 947.
In reaching this conclusion, the court looked first to section 337(c) and then
to the Senate Report. From these, the court said that a Commission determination
on the merits in favor of a complainant under section 337(d), (e) or (f) is not an
appealable final determination until the Commission's determination has been referred
to the President pursuant to section 337(g), and approved or not disapproved within
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ground for difference of opinion" or which may "materially advance the ultimate completion of the investigation or subsequent
review of which will be inadequate remedy" will be entertained
by the Commission. 4 "
Interlocutory appeals may only be taken in two situations
without leave of the presiding officer. An order requiring the disclosure of non-party Commission records or the appearance of
government officials or an order allowing or denying an application for intervention may be appealed without leave of the presiding officer. 249 The Commission retains discretion to hear any
interlocutory appeal. Application for review and appeal under

this section will not stay the investigation unless the presiding
officer or the Commission so orders.250
Certain procedural requirements for filing an interlocutory
appeal with the Commission are outlined.251
Any party adversely affected by a final determination of
the Commission pursuant to section 337 may appeal
to the United
22
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 1

V. CONCLUSION
The trend of section 337 determinations has been to protect
the interests of the patentee. Several important aspects of this
trend emerge from analysis of these cases.
The short statutory time periods within which an investigation must be completed 25 assure the patentee of a relatively
the statutory 50-day period. In contrast, a final determination unfavorable to a complainant would be directly appealable since it is not referred to the President.
The court construed the "any person adversely affected" language of section
337(c) to allow a party to appeal from a Commission order which terminated that
party's participation in any proceeding since the order could have the same operative
effect, in terms of economic impact upon the terminated party, as a final determination.
The court found, however, that appellants' economic interests would be adequately and sufficiently represented in the violation portion of the investigation by
the manufacturer and the importer. The court noted that appellants had stated that
they would not take an active part on the unfair act issue and that they would be adequately represented by remaining respondents on the injury issue.
248. 41 Fed. Reg. 17719 (1976) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Chapter II, §
210.60 (b)).
249. Id. § 210.60(a).
250. Id. § 210.60(c).
251. Id. § 210.60.
252. Id.§ 210.61.
253. Section 337(b). There remains the possibility, however, that the actual time
period of the investigation will be lengthened because the Commission, federal court,

ToPicAL SURVEY
quick remedy against the infringing imports, compared to an
infringement action in federal court. At the institution of the
investigation, the patentee knows that, if successful, a remedy
will be ordered within a certain time frame.
The exclusion remedy is especially protective of patentee
interests since it is in rem in effect: it applies not only to the infringing products of respondents, but to all imported products
which infringe the claims of the unexpired patent.2 54 Thus, any
infringing product of any person, whether or not that person was
a party to the determination, is excluded from importation for the
life of the patent. This aspect of the exclusion remedy is particularly effective since it never permits infringing products to
enter the United States after the issuance of the order.255 However, patentee may not recover damages for infringing imports
prior to issuance of the order.
A Commission finding of patent invalidity has no res judicata
or collateral estoppel in federal court proceedings. 256 Thus, if a
patentee does not prevail before the Commission, a federal court
proceeding is still available.2 57
The Commission's standard for injury has been articulated
as the "tendency" test.25 8 Although this might appear to raise
or agency may suspend the Commission's investigation. Section 337(b) (1). See, e.g.,
supra note 27.
254. The two exclusion orders issued to date have excluded all imported products
which infringe the respective patent. See supra note 112. See also supra notes 35, 98.
255. The question remains, however, of how promptly the order will be put into
effect. See also supra notes 35, 98. An importer whose products are excluded by a
customs officer may file a protest. If the protest is denied, the importer may appeal
to the customs court.
PROTEST AGAINST COLLECTOR'S DECISIONS.
(a) Except as provided . . . decisions of the appropriate customs officer,
including the legality of all orders and findings entered into the same, as to- . . .
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery under any provision
of the customs laws; shall be final and conclusive upon all persons including the
United States and any officers thereof unless a protest is filed . . . . or unless a
civil action contesting the denial of the protest, in whole or in part, is commenced
in the United States Customs Court ....
19 U.S.C. § 1514 (Supp. V 1975).
256. See supra notes 9, 26.
257. Federal courts may consider Commission's determinations, however. See
Spalding v. Antonious, 68 F.R.D. 222, 186 U.S.P.Q. 283 (D. Md. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 191 U.S.P.Q. 593 (4th Cir. 1976) where a Commission determination
of patent invalidity under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was noted by the court,
but the patent was found invalid on an independent basis.
258. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the burden on complainant, the Commission has, in fact, been
very lenient in its application of this standard to the facts. 59
Therefore, the only absolute requirement appears to be that complainant must, at least, intend to domestically produce under the
patent in order that an injury might occur.2 °
The increasing expertise of the Commission in patent matters,
combined with the fact that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction for Commission determinations, may prove to be beneficial to patentees.
It is therefore apparent that patent infringement actions before the United States International Trade Commission favor
the interests of the domestic patentee. Although the number of
decisions rendered to date is few, the trend seems clear.
Robert Greene Sterne

259. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
260. See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.

